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NOTE
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS:
THE NEED FOR A MORE ASCERTAINABLE
IMPROPER PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
STANDARD IN THE SEC'S RULE 2(e)
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the federal securities laws' and established the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission)2 in order to
ensure the stability and integrity of the nation's financial markets. ' The
SEC administers numerous statutes, 4 each providing the Commission
with general rulemaking authority.5 Pursuant to this authority, the SEC
has promulgated its Rules of Practice.6 Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) allows the Coin-
1. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78111 (1982)); Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to
80c-3 (1982)); Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1982)); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411,
53 Stat. 1149 (1939) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to 77bbbb (1982)); Pub-
lie Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404,
48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78kk (1982)); Securities
Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa
(1982)).
2. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (1934) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982)).
3. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); SEC v. Southwest
Coal & Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 1318 (5th Cir. 1980).
4. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 211, 54 Stat. 847, 855 (1940)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-ll (1982)); Investment Company Act of 1940,
ch. 686, § 38, 54 Stat. 789, 841 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37 (1982));
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, § 319, 53 Stat. 1149, 1173-74 (1939) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77sss (1982)); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch.
687, § 20, 49 Stat. 803, 833 (1935) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79t (1982));
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 23, 48 Stat. 881, 901 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1982)); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 19(a), 48
Stat. 74, 85 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1982)).
5. See supra note 4. This Note is concerned with the Commission's rules regarding
temporary and permanent suspension. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
6. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1 to .29 (1984). These Rules contain numerous procedural
safeguards. The respondent is entitled to timely notice of both the charges against him
and the questions of fact and law to be determined. Id. § 201.6(a). He may retain counsel
to represent him in connection with the proceeding. Id. § 201.2(b). The respondent may
file an answer to the charges against him, id. § 201.7(a), and may move for a more defi-
nite statement of the charges, id. § 201.7(d). He is entitled to a trial-type hearing pre-
sided over by an impartial administrative law judge, other duly-appointed officer, or a
Commission member. Id. § 201.11 (b)-(c). The respondent has a right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses, id. at § 201.14(a), and object to the admission or exclusion of evidence,
id. § 201.11(e). Oral or documentary evidence may be presented on his behalf. .d.
§ 201.14(a). Respondents may compel the production of evidence by subpoena, id.
§ 201.14(b)(1), and may obtain witnesses' statements from the Commission in order to
prepare for cross-examination, id. § 201.11.1. When the hearing is concluded, the re-
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mission to censure7 independent accountants or suspend them from prac-
ticing before it' if, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, the
accountant is found "to be lacking in character or integrity or to have
engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct."9
Although Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) should not be a vehicle for establishing fun-
spondent may submit briefs, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id.
§ 201.16(d). The administrative law judge's initial decision must include findings of fact
and conclusions of law with supporting reasons on all material issues of fact, law or
discretion presented in the record. Id. § 201.16(a). The respondent may seek review by
the SEC, which may affirm, reverse or modify the initial decision based on its own review
of the record. Id. § 201.17(g)(2). The rules do not provide for judicial review. The re-
spondent may, however, seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in a federal
court after exhausting administative remedies. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d
570, 573-75 (2d Cir. 1979).
7. See infra note 17.
8. For an accountant, such practice includes "the preparation of any statement,
opinion or other paper ... filed with the Commission ...with [his] consent." 17
C.F.R. § 201.2(g)(2) (1984). Thus, an independent accountant who audits and reports on
financial statements used in a client's annual report is considered to have practiced before
the Commission.
9. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1984). Rule 2(e) states that
[t]he Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of ap-
pearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the
Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to
possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in
character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional
conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the
violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to
80b-20) or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Id. at § 201.2(e)(1).
Despite the general rulemaking authority that the Commission possesses, there is disa-
greement about the SEC's authority to discipline professionals who appear before it. See
Block & Ferris, SEC Rule 2(e)-A New Standard for Ethical Conduct or an Unauthorized
Web of Ambiguity, 11 Cap. U.L. Rev. 501, 508-12 (1981); Note, Regulation of the Ac-
counting Profession Through Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice: Valid or Invalid
Exercise of Power ?, 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1159, 1172-87 (1980). The Second Circuit has
upheld the rule as being "'reasonably related' to the purposes of the securities laws."
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582 (2d Cir. 1979). The court noted that Rule
2(e) "represents an attempt by the Commission to protect the integrity of its own
processes." Id. at 582. Rule 2(e) has generated much discussion. See, e.g., Downing &
Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 Notre Dame Law. 774 (1979);
Gruenbaum, The SEC's Use of Rule 2(e) to Discipline Accountants and Other Profession-
als, 56 Notre Dame Law. 820 (1981); Krane, The Attorney Unshackled: SEC Rule 2(e)
Violates Clients' Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 57 Notre Dame Law. 50 (1981);
Comment, SEC Disciplinary Proceedings Against Accountants-A Study in Unbridled Dis-
cretion, 27 Ad. L. Rev. 255 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SEC Disciplinary Proceedings].
The Rule's applicability to attorneys has also been the subject of analysis. See, e.g.,
Kosek, Professional Responsibility of Accountants and Lawyers Before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 72 L. Libr. J. 453, 463-69 (1979); Comment, SEC Disciplinary
Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the
Attorney, 1972 Duke L.J. 969, 988-93 (1972); Note, Attorney Liability Under SEC Rule
2(E): A New Standard?, 11 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 83, 84 (1979). This Note will not question
the SEC's authority to make disciplinary rules. Rather, it will examine Rule 2(e) and
propose a revision.
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damentally new professional standards,"° the Commission recently
sought to apply the rule in such a manner." In addition, although the
SEC in employing the rule ostensibly applies standards of reasonableness
to accountants' conduct, in some instances it has apparently held ac-
countants to a higher standard. 2 For example, in many instances Gen-
erally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) call upon an accountant to
exercise professional judgment, 3 yet the SEC uses disciplinary Rule
10. Burton, SEC Enforcement and Professional Accountants: Philosophy, Objectives
and Approach, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 19, 20 (1975) (authored by the SEC's Chief Account-
ant); see In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) r 82,847, at
84,169-70 (1981) ('elemental notions of fairness dictate that the Commission should not
establish new rules of conduct and impose them retroactively upon professionals who
acted at the time without reason to believe that their conduct was unethical or im-
proper"). See infra note 107.
11. On November 27, 1984, the Commission issued an "Opinion and Order" that
settled a Rule 2(e) proceeding it had instituted against the accounting firm of Coopers &
Lybrand and one of the firm's partners. See In re Coopers & Lybrand, Acct. Series Re-
lease No. 45, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,445, at 63,163 (1984). The controversy
arose from Coopers & Lybrand's audits of Digilog, Inc. Digilog is a company that devel-
ops, manufactures and sells electronic equipment. Id. DBS, Inc. was created to market
Digilog's products. Id. at 63,164. Digilog agreed to provide initial financing for DBS in
return for convertible notes. Id. If converted, the notes would provide Digilog with 90%
of DBS's authorized common stock. Id. Under the Digilog-DBS arrangement, DBS was
required to employ management that was satisfactory to Digilog. Id. Furthermore, DBS
would have to provide Digilog with periodic audited financial statements, and could not
alter its bylaws or certificate of incorporation without Digilog's consent. Id. The deal was
contingent on the issuance of a letter by Coopers & Lybrand stating that Digilog would
not have to consolidate DBS's results. Id.
The Commission's Regulation S-X prohibits consolidation of a subsidiary's operations
when the parent does not own a majority of the voting shares. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.3A-
02(a) (1984) (registrant shall not consolidate the operations of any subsidiary that is not
majority owned); id. § 210.1-02(m) (majority-owned subsidiary is one whose parent and/
or the parent's other majority-owned subsidiaries own more than 50% of the subsidiary's
outstanding voting shares). Although Digilog owned convertible notes, it did not own
any outstanding voting shares. In re Coopers & Lybrand, Acct. Series Release No. 45, 6
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,445, at 63,164-65. The Commission asserts in its Opinion
and Order, however, that DBS's results should have been consolidated with those of Digi-
log. Id. at 63,168. According to the SEC, the agreements between the two companies
gave Digilog control over DBS. Id. at 63,164. Therefore, the Commission argues that
regardless of Regulation S-X, consolidation was appropriate. Id. at 63,167-68. In its
Opinion and Order, the Commission declared that situations arise "in which control,
apart from actual majority ownership, strongly suggests the need for consolidation in
order to accurately depict the economic realities of the relationship between two entities."
Id. at 63,167. The Commission then asserted that "consolidation may be required in the
absence of majority ownership in form where one entity in substance achieves the same
effect as majority ownership through control by contract or otherwise." Id. Although
Coopers & Lybrand was ultimately not sanctioned in any manner for its decisions and
conduct during the Digilog-DBS engagement, it appears that the Commission initially
sought to change, or at least modify, its consolidation rule during a disciplinary
proceeding.
12. See, eg., In re Touche Ross & Co., Acct. Series Release No. 16, 6 Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) 73,416, at 63,079-80 (1983) (insufficient evidence gathering); In re
Goldberg, Acct. Series Release No. 13, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,413, at 63,060
(1983) (same). See supra note 11 and infra note 30.
13. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) govern the auditor's judgment-
1984]
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2(e)(1)(ii) to second-guess that judgment.14
The result is tension between accountants who seek to follow the rules
and standards that the profession and SEC require, and the Commission,
which seeks to ensure the integrity of the financial information provided
to the investing public.15 This Note contends that the Commission
should utilize the reasonable accountant standard when reviewing an ac-
countant's judgments. Part I demonstrates that a change in the current
Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) is mandated by the due process clause. Specifically, due
process requires a more substantive standard than "improper profes-
sional conduct." Alternatively, the "improper professional conduct"
standard is unconstitutionally vague. Part II outlines possible revisions
of the rule. A revised rule should enable the Commission to discipline
accountants who negligently fail to comply with professional or SEC
rules. When applying a rule that requires professional judgment, 16 how-
ever, certain limitations should be placed on the sanctions available to
the Commission. 7 This Note concludes that the Commission should not
hold an accountant to a higher standard than his profession mandates,
unless the Commission promulgates a formal rule to that effect.'"
making process during the audit and the subsequent issuance of the audit report. In
addition, GAAS outlines the professional qualities expected of an auditor. American In-
stitute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Professional Standards AU § 150.01
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Professional Standards].
14. See Middleton, Hot Item at the SEC: 'Cooking the Books', Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13,
1984, at 1, col. 2.
15. Id. at 32.
16. Professional judgment is required throughout GAAS. For example, the auditor
must use his judgment when "obtaining and evaluating evidential matter concerning the
assertions in . . . financial statements," Professional Standards, supra note 13, AU
§ 326.02, determining the amount and type of financial data to be tested, id. AU § 327.11,
deciding what procedures to use during the audit, id. AU § 326.12, determining whether
an investor is able to exercise significant influence over an investee, id. AU § 332.07,
considering whether to obtain written representations from his client's management, id.
AU § 333.03, deciding whether or not to utilize a specialist during an audit, id. AU
§ 336.02, and deciding what, if any, disclosure should be made concerning principal con-
ditions that raise questions about an entity's ability to continue in existence, id. AU
§ 340.10. The SEC's accounting regulations are contained in its Regulation S-X. 17
C.F.R. § 210.1-01 to .12-29 (1984). These rules set forth "the form and content of and
requirements for financial statements" to be filed with the Commission. Id. § 210.1-01(a).
These rules are generally more specific than GAAS. See id. § 210.3-01 to .3-21.
17. Rule 2(e) authorizes disbarment of professionals who practice before the Commis-
sion. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1984). The Commission has also used Rule 2(e) to censure
accountants. See SEC Disciplinary Proceedings, supra note 9, at 266-72 (discussing the
SEC's use of sanctions). See infra note 55.
18. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has recently adopted its own rules of proce-
dure which appear to be modeled after those of the SEC. The Board's rules state in part
that it
may censure any person practicing before it or may deny, temporarily or per-
manently, the privilege of any person to practice before it if such person is
found by the Board, after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter,
(1) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, (2) to be lack-
ing in character or professional integrity, (3) to have engaged in any dilatory,
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I. DUE PROCESS RESTRICTIONS ON AGENCY DISCIPLINE
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA or Act) 9 permits the SEC to
establish rules of procedure.2 ° The Act does not "authorize or limit the
discipline, including disbarment, of individuals who appear in a represen-
tative capacity before an agency."2 The Commission's use of its rules of
procedure to discipline accountants has in some instances entailed the
second-guessing of professional judgments.' For example, the defendant
in In re Touche Ross23 was disciplined for, among other things, its judg-
ment concerning a client's accounting treatment of a particular series of
transactions.24 The firm's decision was based on research into the rele-
vant industry's practices, and representations received during the audit.'
Touche Ross did not obtain the written contract detailing the transac-
tions because the client informed the firm that "there might be 'antitrust
problems' in securing" the document.26 Instead, the firm requested and
received from the company with which the client contracted a letter that
described the arrangement.27
Touche Ross' judgment to make its characterization of the transaction
without examining the written contract involved the gathering of evi-
dence during an audit. The professional standards provide that the
amount of evidence necessary to support the accountant's opinion is to
be determined by the auditor in the exercise of his professional judg-
ment.28 Although the Commission has not stated that it will hold an
accountant to a standard higher than reasonableness, its analysis of
Touche Ross' behavior raises the question whether an accountant who
makes an incorrect, but reasonable, judgment will be subject to disci-
pline. According to the SEC, Touche Ross "incorrectly concluded" that
it was unnecessary to obtain a copy of the contract.29 Thus, despite the
alternative investigations made in light of the client's legal concerns with
securing the contract, the firm was censured."0 The concern engendered
obstructionist, egregious, contemptuous, contumacious or other unethical or
improper professional conduct before the Board.
49 Fed. Reg. 25,622 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 513.4(a)).
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-559 (1982).
20. See id. § 552(a)(1)(C).
21. Id. § 500(d)(2).
22. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
23. Acct. Series Release No. 16, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,416, at 63,069
(1983).
24. Id. at 63,080.
25. Id. at 63,079-80.
26. Id. at 63,079.
27. Id. at 63,079-80.
28. See Professional Standards, supra note 13, AU § 326.19.
29. See In re Touche Ross & Co., Acct. Series Release No. 16, 6 Fed. Sec L Rep.
(CCII) 73,416, at 63,079 (1983).
30. See id. at 63,080. In an earlier case, In re Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Acct.
Series Release No. 173, [1937-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) F 72,195, at
62,410 (1975), the Commission prohibited the firm from accepting new SEC clients for
six months, due to the firm's conduct during certain audits. Id. at 62,455. In discussing
1984]
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by this decision is underscored by the Commission's recent enforcement
proceeding against the firm of Coopers & Lybrand.31 There, the account-
ing firm's judgment involved determining whether the operating results
of two entities should be consolidated, despite an SEC regulation that
appeared to prohibit consolidation on the facts presented. 32
Serious constitutional questions are presented by the Commission's ap-
parent application of the improper professional conduct rule to avoid
standards of reasonableness applicable to the accounting profession. 33
Two alternative due process inquiries reveal the constitutional infirmity
of Rule 2(e) proceedings in which the accountant's conduct is measured
by something more than a common law negligence standard. Under the
first approach, the improper professional conduct standard is unconstitu-
tionally vague.34 Under the second analysis, Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) is constitu-
tionally suspect because due process requires some substantive, as well as
procedural, standards to control agency discretion. 35 The two ap-
proaches differ only in that the vagueness doctrine concerns statutory
enactments while the substantive standards approach applies to agency
discretion.
A. Triggering Due Process Protection
Due process is implicated whenever a property or liberty interest is
adversely affected by state action. 36 The Supreme Court has recognized
that traditional common law concepts of property do not adequately cat-
one of these audits, the Commission clearly second-guessed the firm and even appeared to
establish a standard of conduct:
We recognize that the action taken by PMM [Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.]
was considerable, especially in the face of what appeared to the Firm to be
countervailing positions taken by two prominent law firms. PMM's letter com-
munication to both boards of directors was appropriate and put them in a posi-
tion to take necessary action. Nonetheless, we believe that independent
auditors in such circumstances should insist on revised financial statements be-
ing sent bo shareholders when they are professionally associated with such state-
ments, whether audited or unaudited. Further, while we believe that primary
responsibility rests with management and directors of public companies, where
they refuse to resolicit shareholders, under these circumstances, we believe that
independent public accountants have an obligation to notify the Commission.
Id. at 62,419-20. Although this situation is distinguishable from Touche Ross because it
does not involve the application of a GAAS provision requiring an exercise of profes-
sional judgment, it underscores the vulnerable position accounting firms are in due to
certain applications of Rule 2(e). The possibility that Rule 2(e) may be abused is height-
ened by the fact that most proceedings result in settlements without adjudications of law
or fact. See infra note 109.
31. See In re Coopers & Lybrand, Acct. Series Release No. 45, 6 Fed. Sec L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 73,445, at 63,163 (1984).
32. See id. at 63,165, 63,167. See supra note 11.
33. See supra notes 11, 12, 16, 23-32 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
36. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young,
Constitutional Law 528 (2d ed. 1983).
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egorize many forms of existing wealth." For this reason, due process
protection extends beyond interests in real estate, chattels and money.
38
Property interests in welfare benefits, 9 a driver's license," a license to
practice law41 or psychology42 and the privilege to practice accounting
before the Board of Tax Appeals 43 have all been held to be protected by
the due process clause. A government-sponsored entitlement gives rise
to a property right so long as the government does not "[retain] un-
restricted discretion over future enjoyment of the [entitlement]."" An
accountant's privilege45 to appear before the SEC is properly viewed as
an entitlement because it is derived from federal regulations that do not
provide the Commission with unrestricted discretion to prohibit or sus-
pend such appearances. Rather, its Rules of Practice set forth the
grounds and procedures for such disciplinary action.4 Thus, the ac-
countant has a property interest in his right to practice before the SEC
that may not be terminated without due process.
The concept of a liberty interest is premised on the notion that a per-
son has the right to enjoy his good name and reputation.4 7 Several
37. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); see also Logan v. Zimmer-
mann Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1981) (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) ("the types of inter-
ests protected as 'property' are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating 'to the
whole domain of social and economic fact' ").
38. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it....
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understand-
ings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.
Id. at 577.
39. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
40. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
41. See In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.
Young, supra note 36, at 542.
42. See Herz v. Degnan, 648 F.2d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1981).
43. See Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926).
44. Doran v. Houle, 721 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 344-47 (1976)), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2152 (1984); see J. Nowak, R. Rotunda
& J. Young, supra note 36, at 547.
45. See 17 C.F.R. 201.2(e)(1) (1984) (accountant's appearance before the Commission
characterized as privilege).
46. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1 to .29 (1984). Due process limits the power of government
to terminate an entitlement, regardless of whether the entitlement is classified as a "right"
or a "privilege." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
47. See, eg., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 722-23 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Certainly the enjoyment of one's good name and reputation has been recognized repeat-
edly in our cases as being among the most cherished of rights enjoyed by a free people,
and therefore as falling within the concept of personal 'liberty.' "); Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) ("Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard are essential."); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572
1984]
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courts have held that one can assert a liberty interest when one has been
stigmatized by state conduct and the stigmatization results in tangible
loss.48 Although these courts have not defined exactly what constitutes a
stigma,49 liberty interests have been found when bank officers were dis-
charged for dishonesty,50 a harness racing driver was discharged for "in-
consistent driving,"51 a college football coach was discharged for
allegedly violating conference rules5" and a psychologist was prohibited
from designating himself a Ph.D. because he did not comply with statu-
tory requirements.5 3 In each of these cases the court found stigmatizing
government conduct coupled with tangible loss of employment
opportunity.
SEC disciplinary proceedings can affect an accountant's liberty interest
in one of two ways. If he is suspended or barred from appearing before
(1972) ("In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
'liberty' must be broad indeed."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("With-
out doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."). However, the Supreme Court has never precisely defined "liberty." Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
48. See, e.g., In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 796 (5th Cir. 1983); Margoles v. Tormey,
643 F.2d 1292, 1297-98 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 939 (1981); Fitzgerald v. Moun-
tain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 602 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956
(1980); Rodriguez de Quinonez v. Perez, 596 F.2d 486, 489 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 840 (1979); Stanley v. Big Eight Conference, 463 F. Supp. 920, 928 (W.D. Mo.
1978); Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). The
Court has stated that an individual's "reputation alone, apart from some more tangible
interest such as employment," does not constitute a liberty or property interest. Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). One court has articulated a "stigma plus" test to deter-
mine whether a liberty interest exists:
First, the plaintiff must be stigmatized by the State's conduct. Such "stigma"
must amount to a charge that is likely to seriously damage the plaintiff's "good
name reputation, honor, or integrity" in the eyes of the community. Second, in
addition to the infliction of stigma, a plaintiff must suffer tangible loss in con-
junction with the infliction of the "stigma."
Albamonte v. Bickley, 573 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 701 (1976) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)). The Second
Circuit, basing its decision on Supreme Court jurisprudence, incorporated the following
requirements into the test: the stigmatizing information must be false and must be made
public by the offending governmental entity. See Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 197
(2d Cir. 1977).
49. Courts that attempt to define "stigma" use the language of Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971), regarding damage to a person's "good name, reputa-
tion, honor, or integrity." See, e.g., Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613
F.2d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 1980); Albamonte v. Bickley, 573 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N.D. I11.
1983).
50. See Rodriguez de Quinonez v. Perez, 596 F.2d 486, 488-89 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 840 (1979).
51. See Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 593, 602 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
52. See Stanley v. Big Eight Conference, 463 F. Supp. 920, 928-29 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
53. See Buxton v. Lovell, 559 F. Supp. 979, 993 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
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the Commission,14 the stigma placed on the accountant is clearly coupled
with a loss of employment opportunities. If a Rule 2(e) action results
only in censure," the stigma placed on his business reputation can still
seriously damage his employment opportunities. Although in the latter
circumstance it is unlikely that a liberty interest arises unless censure
results in an actual loss of professional opportunity, one court has viewed
injury to one's business reputation as sufficient to establish a liberty inter-
est.56 Thus, the effect of SEC disciplinary proceedings on the account-
ant's liberty and property interests is sufficient to trigger due process
protection.
B. A Vagueness Analysis Under the Due Process Clause
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a product of due process analysis,
which incorporates notions of fair notice and warning.57 The doctrine is
frequently referred to in terms of the common intelligence test articu-
lated more than a half century ago by the Supreme Court in Connally v.
General Construction Co. :58 "[a] statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law."5 9 The Court has recently
54. Disciplinary proceedings can result in temporary or permanent suspension from
appearing before the Commission, see 17 C.F.R. 201.2(e)(1) (1984); see, eg., In re Wil-
son, Acct. Series Release No. 30, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,430, at 63,128 (1984);
In re Mayo, Acct. Series Release No. 29, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,429, at 63,125
(1984); In re Goldberg, Acct. Series Release No. 13, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) C 73,413,
at 63,061 (1983), and limitations on an accounting firm's business, see In re Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Acct. Series Release No. 173, [1937-82 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,195, at 62,455 (1975) (firm prohibited from accepting new SEC
clients for six months). See generally Bialkin, Sanctions Against Accountants, 8 Rev. of
See. Reg. 823 (1975) (sanctions employed in Rule 2(e) proceedings).
55. Rule 2(e) proceedings can result in censure. See, eg., In re Wade, Jr., Acct. Series
Release No. 32, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,432, at 63,137 (1984); In re Murphy,
Hauser, O'Connor & Quinn, Acct. Series Release No. 18, 6 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,418, at 63,089 (1983); In re Touche Ross, Acct. Series Release No. 16, 6 Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) 73,416, at 63,080 (1983); In re Simmon, Acct. Series Release No. 12, 6
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 73,412, at 63,052 (1983).
56. See Stanley v. Big Eight Conference, 463 F. Supp. 920, 928 (W.D. Mo. 1978)
(plaintiff had tangible interests not only in employment, but also in "his professional
reputation which. . . determine[s] ... future employment opportunities").
57. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); United States v.
Dorey, 711 F.2d 125, 128 (9th Cir. 1983); Robinson v. Berman, 594 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1979); United States v. Peden, 556 F.2d 278, 280 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871
(1977); Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F. Supp. 1297, 1304 (D.N.J. 1979); Cicero v.
Olgiati, 410 F. Supp. 1080, 1093, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
58. 269 U.S. 385 (1926); accord Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
162 (1972); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964); Owens v. Wainwright,
698 F.2d 1111, 1115 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 117 (1983); Casbah, Inc. v.
Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 558 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982); Geiger v.
City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479
(5th Cir. 1976).
59. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
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recognized that the most important aspect of the doctrine is its prohibi-
tion against arbitrary enforcement. 6°
Although generally used in examinations of penal statutes, 6' the void-
for-vagueness doctrine has also been strictly applied 62 to quasi-criminal
ordinances63 and administrative regulations.' 4 There is also authority for
applying the doctrine to business license statutes. 65 Rule 2(e) discipli-
nary proceedings, like those of a bar association, 66 may properly be
60. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974). Vague laws offend three "impor-
tant values": such laws do not provide a person of "ordinary intelligence" with a reason-
able opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly; they permit
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; and they may "abut" upon and thereby inhibit
basic first amendment freedoms. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09
(1972).
61. See Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1856 (1983) (criminal statute that re-
quired loitering individuals to provide "credible and reliable" identification was unconsti-
tutionally vague); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107 (1972) (anti-noise
ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague); Cole v. Arkan-
sas, 338 U.S. 345, 354 (1949) (law preventing individuals from acting in concert to dis-
rupt lawful activities at the site of a labor dispute was not unconstitutionally vague); New
England Accessories Trade Ass'n v. Tierney, 528 F. Supp. 404, 412 (D. Me. 1981) (state
drug act was not unconstitutionally vague), affd, 691 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1982); Amuse-
ment Devices Ass'n v. Ohio, 443 F. Supp. 1040, 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (statute prohibit-
ing persons from furnishing legal services to a criminal syndicate with the purpose of
establishing a criminal syndicate or facilitating any of its activities was impermissibly
vague).
62. See infra note 69.
63. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
499 (1982). The Court indicated that the stigmatizing effect of a quasi-criminal ordinance
"may warrant a relatively strict [vagueness] test." Id. at 499. As discussed previously, a
Rule 2(e) proceeding may attach a significant stigma to its subject. See supra notes 47-56
and accompanying text. The Court in Flipside also noted that "economic regulation is
subject to a less strict vagueness test." Flipside, 455 U.S. at 498. Economic regulation is
frequently narrower than other laws, and subject businesses are expected to consult the
pertinent regulations before acting. Id. The Court remarked that regulated enterprises
may be able to clarify vague regulations either by their own inquiry or through an admin-
istrative process. Id. To characterize Rule 2(e) as economic regulation, however, would
be to ignore its pervasive disciplinary effect. In addition, the nature of auditing makes it
impractical for an accountant to seek the Commission's recommendation each time a
question arises regarding the amount of evidence to be gathered or the tests to be con-
ducted. Moreover, the SEC has no desire to play such a supervisory role. See Downing &
Miller, supra note 9, at 786.
64. See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (common
intelligence test applied to an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation).
65. The Supreme Court has implied that a void-for-vagueness test applies to business
licenses. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 290 (1982) (Court
assumed without deciding that a vagueness analysis would apply to a business license).
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has assumed without deciding that a vagueness analysis
can be used for statutes governing licenses. See Baer v. City of Wauwatosa, 716 F.2d
1117, 1124 (7th Cir. 1983); cf. Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 505 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1974) (common intelligence test was applied to
safety regulation imposing a $30 fine).
66. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) ("Disbarment, designed to protect the
public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer.").
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viewed as quasi-criminal.67 Rule 2(e) cases also involve revocation or
suspension of the privilege to practice before the Commission6" and are
therefore similar to business license cases. Under either category, Rule
2(e)'s improper professional conduct standard should undergo a rela-
69tively stringent vagueness review.
The common intelligence test is not satisfied when the Commission
seeks to use the improper professional conduct rule to sanction account-
ants who have acted reasonably. If an accountant makes a reasonable
professional judgment where GAAS so mandates, he must still guess at
the meaning of "improper professional conduct" in order to avoid disci-
pline.7 ° Clearly, an accountant who ignores established rules and stan-
dards has behaved improperly. Similarly, an accountant who violates the
67. Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (in determining
whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory, one should consider "[w]hether the
sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alter-
native purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." (emphasis in original)
(footnotes omitted)); Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (disciplinary
proceeding before the FTC considered quasi-criminal). But cf. United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1980) (factors set forth in Mendoza-Martinez are neither exhaustive
nor dispositive). In quasi-criminal proceedings courts have been reluctant to afford all
the protections that adhere to a criminal action. See, e.g., In re Phelps, 637 F.2d 171, 176
(10th Cir. 1981) (attorney has no due process right to present a closing argument in a
disciplinary proceeding); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 474-75 (7th Cir.) (fifth amendment
safeguards against self-incrimination do not apply in a disciplinary proceeding), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Childs v. McCord, 420 F. Supp. 428, 432 (D. Md. 1976)
(same), affd sub nom. Childs v. Schlitz, 556 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1977).
68. See, e.g., In re Wilson, Acct. Series Release No. 30, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,430, at 63,128 (1984); In re Mayo, Acct. Series Release No. 29, 6 Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 73,429, at 63,125 (1984); In re Goldberg, Acct. Series Release No. 13, 6 Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,413, at 63,061 (1983).
69. See In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 1973) ("[I]n view of the gravity of
the punishment ...which includes stiff fines, or even suspension or disbarment with all
of the consequential damage which that entails, the test which must be employed as to
the constitutionality of the disciplinary machinery to be used must be a very severe one."
(footnotes omitted)). Professor Davis has noted the importance of vagueness analysis in
the context of administrative agencies. See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 7:26, at 131 (2d ed. 1979) ("Vagueness of enforcement policy or of any other policy
may be held unconstitutional because it permits arbitrary and discriminatory action;
courts may accordingly require that the vagueness be corrected by guiding standards or
rules."). See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. When a vagueness examination is
made, the Court has indicated that a scienter requirement in the challenged enactment
may serve to mitigate vagueness problems. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). The improper professional conduct
standard lacks any culpability requirement.
70. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 718-19 (1978) ("The conclusion that
a statute is too vague and therefore void as a matter of due process is thus unlikely to be
triggered without two findings: that the individual challenging the statute is indeed one
of the entrapped innocent, and that it would have been practical for the legislature to
draft more precisely." (footnotes omitted)). See supra notes 11, 12, 23-32 and accompa-
nying text.
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law is a proper target for a Rule 2(e) improper professional conduct ac-
tion.7" When, however, the Commission, without warning, holds the ac-
countant to a stricter standard than negligence, actual notice of what
constitutes improper behavior is lacking and arbitrary enforcement
exists.7
2
Unfortunately, because most vagueness challenges fail,73 courts will
hesitate to strike down Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) on this ground. The Supreme
Court prefers to uphold challenged legislation by construing it nar-
rowly.74 On one occasion the Court noted that it will strike down a stat-
ute as unconstitutional "[o]nly if no construction can save the Act from
[the] claim of unconstitutionality."' 71 It is therefore possible that a
vagueness challenge to Rule 2(e) could succeed as applied to a particular
accountant, but leave the improper professional conduct standard
facially intact.7
6
C. The "Substantive Standard" Due Process Analysis
The concept that administrative agencies must exercise their discretion
in accordance with substantive standards is fairly new to due process
analysis.77 Although not uniformly accepted,78 the principle has been
71. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) ("One to whose conduct a statute
clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness."); Pordum v. Board of
Regents, 491 F.2d 1281, 1285 (2d Cir.) (vagueness claim failed because appellant could
not be surprised to learn that felony conviction might bar him from teaching in the public
schools), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974). In the case of an accountant who violates the
law, however, the SEC may be able to sanction the accountant under another part of
Rule 2(e). See 17 C.F.R. § 201-2(e)(1)(iii) (1984) (an accountant who willfully violates,
or willfully aids and abets the violation of any provision of the federal securities laws may
be sanctioned).
72. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See supra note 60
and accompanying text.
73. Cf, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 35-36 (1963)
(vagueness challenge to the Robinson-Patman Act failed); Fleming v. United States Dep't
of Agriculture, 713 F.2d 179, 184-85 (6th Cir. 1983) (vagueness challenge to the Horse
Protection Act failed); United States v. Batson, 706 F.2d 657, 681 (5th Cir. 1983) (vague-
ness challenge to regulation under the Upland Cotton Price Support Program failed);
Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 505 F.2d 869, 872-73 (10th
Cir. 1974) (vagueness challenge to a regulation containing the words "near proximity"
failed); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1974) (vague-
ness challenge to a safety regulation of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission failed).
74. See Note, The Void-For- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 67, 86 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Vagueness Doctrine]; see, e.g., United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
75. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 100 (1945).
76. See Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 74, at 86.
77. See Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 854 (E.D. Va.
1980) (substantive standards due process analysis is in its "fledgeling stage").
78. Compare Western Pioneer, Inc. v. United States, 709 F.2d 1331, 1339 (9th Cir.
1983) (due process does not require Coast Guard to publish substantive guidelines for
allowable cargo of tenders because governing statutes do not involve discretion) and
Jarecha v. INS, 417 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1969) (Attorney General's failure to establish
standards to guide discretion of the Board of Immigration Appeals does not violate due
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applied in a variety of contexts7 9 that are relevant to due process analysis
of SEC disciplinary rules. The Second Circuit has held that due process
requires a municipal housing authority to employ "ascertainable stan-
dards" when selecting among applicants for public housing."0 Similarly,
the Seventh Circuit found due process lacking in a municipal assistance
program that operated without any published standards of eligibility. 8'
The state actor in these cases had been able to exercise "virtually unfet-
tered discretion."
8 2
The SEC is currently in an analogous position with regard to the stan-
dards to be applied in disciplinary proceedings.8 3 The Commission's dis-
cretion is limited only by the procedural safeguards contained in its
process) and Baker v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 490 F. Supp. 520, 530 (S.D.
Ohio 1980) (presence of informal standards satisfied due process requirements), affd, 675
F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1982) with White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (due process mandates that welfare assistance program have written standards)
and Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) (due
process requires selection among applicants for public housing be made in accordance
with ascertainable standards) and 2 K. Davis, supra note 69, at 131 ("in some circum-
stances the lack of rules or standards is so unreasonable that due process is denied"). See
supra notes 11, 12, 23-32 and accompanying text and infra note 90 and accompanying
text.
79. See Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 854 (E.D. Va.
1980) (due process mandates that Department of Interior publish substantive criteria for
qualifications for landmarks); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134, 1139.40
(D.N.H. 1976) (due process requires substantive standards for administration of a state
general welfare program); K. Davis, supra note 69, at 188 (1982 Supp.) (the law is slowly
evolving towards the Historic Green Springs approach). See infra notes 80-81 and accom-
panying text. But see Jarecha v. INS, 417 F.2d 220, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1969) (due process
does not require Attorney General to establish standards for INS denial of change in
status).
80. See Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968). But
see Baker v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 490 F. Supp. 520, 530 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (due process does not require publication of housing eligibility requirements), aft'd,
675 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1982).
81. See White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
82. See id. at 754 (administrator of welfare program had unfettered discretion over
distribution of benefits); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d
Cir. 1968) (lack of ascertainable standards in selection among applicants for public hous-
ing left unfettered discretion in hands of administrators); Baker-Chaput v. Cainmet, 406
F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (D.N.H. 1976) (administrator of welfare program had complete
discretion); 2 K. Davis, supra note 69, at 129 ("[Tlhousands of federal, state, and local
administrators are annually deciding millions or billions of cases, formal and informal,
without 'written standards and regulations' and without a system of precedents, and writ-
ten standards or regulations are feasible for a large portion of them.").
83. See supra notes 11, 12, 23-32 and accompanying text. The Commission does pub-
lish a topical index of enforcement proceedings involving accountants. See Index of Acct.
& Auditing Enforcement Releases, Acct. Series Release No. 1, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,401, at 63,011, 63,012 (1982) ("The Commission announces the publication of a
topical index to its Accounting Series Releases that have announced enforcement actions
involving accountants. The topical index is intended to facilitate reference to the Com-
mission's views on particular accounting and auditing matters that have given rise to
Commission enforcement actions. . .[but is not] a comprehensive representation of the
Commission's views on these matters." (emphasis added)).
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Rules of Practice.8 4 The improper professional conduct standard enables
the Commission to sanction accountants for violating GAAS when the
accountant has actually complied with GAAS by exercising reasonable
professional judgment."5 For example, the Commission has imposed
sanctions for failing to accumulate enough evidence,86 but it has not indi-
cated the amount of evidence that would be sufficient.87 Thus, an ac-
countant who diligently and reasonably exercises professional judgment
in accordance with GAAS8 can be sanctioned for engaging in improper
professional conduct even though he is without notice of what the SEC
considers to be proper professional conduct.8 9
Although the improper professional conduct standard provides ac-
countants with some guidance, the SEC retains broad discretion to deter-
mine, in the individual case, whether an accountant's conduct was
proper.90 A more ascertainable standard, such as the one proposed later
in this Note,91 is necessary to control the Commission's almost unbridled
discretion and thereby bring SEC procedures into compliance with "sub-
stantive standard" due process requirements. Moreover, a nebulous disci-
plinary rule that can be used to "trap the innocent" 92 serves only to
diminish the credibility of the SEC's disciplinary mechanism. 93
II. SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 2(e)(1)(ii)
As discussed in Part I, the current version of Rule 2(e) allows the
Commission, in the course of a disciplinary proceeding, to make ad hoc
determinations of whether an accountant's conduct was proper. 94 In ad-
dition, the present rule's lack of an explicitly stated culpability standard"
84. See supra note 6.
85. See supra note 16.
86. In re Touche Ross & Co., Acct. Series Release No. 16, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
9 73,416, at 63,077 (1983); In re Goldberg, Acct. Series Release No. 13, 6 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 73,413, at 63,060 (1983).
87. The Commission has set forth its views regarding certain accounting matters in its
Staff Accounting Bulletins. See Staff Accounting Bulletins, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 74,101, at 63,401 (1984). These bulletins, however, do not deal with an auditor's gath-
ering of evidential matter or conduct of audit tests.
88. See supra note 16.
89. See supra note 86.
90. See supra notes 11, 12, 23-32 and accompanying text.
91. See infra pt. II.
92. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
93. See Downing & Miller, supra note 9, at 774 ("Receut 2(e) proceedings against
accountants demonstrate that the SEC has converted the rule from one designed to serve
the limited salutary purpose of exercising disciplinary authority over the incompetent,
unethical or dishonest accounting practitioner to a rule which has effectively been utilized
to pervasively regulate accounting firms and the profession as a whole.")
94. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
95. See Downing & Miller, supra note 9, at 783 ("the possibility exists under the
standards of the rule and the Commission's application thereof, that a Rule 2(e) proceed-
ing may be adjudicated without regard to any standard of culpability or without regard to
proof of fault."); see also Gruenbaum, supra note 9, at 832 (language of Rule 2(e) raises
questions regarding applicable culpability standards).
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is of critical, and possibly constitutional, importance. 96
Under the amended rule proposed here, an accountant who negligently
fails to follow a black-letter accounting or auditing principle should be
subject to discipline. An accountant who contravenes GAAS-for exam-
ple, by failing to confirm receivables through direct communication or
by referring to the work of a specialist when expressing an unqualified
audit opinion 98 -could be sanctioned for his negligent failure to follow
the applicable GAAS provision. The vast majority of accounting and au-
diting rules, however, involve professional judgment.99 In these cases, an
amended Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) should also require proof that an accountant
behaved at least negligently. Negligence should be measured by the stan-
dard of the reasonable accountant."°° This proposal recognizes that judg-
ment often involves consideration of complex facts not amenable to exact
determination."° In fact, the pervasive role of judgment in GAAS1°2
strongly indicates that an accountant cannot be a guarantor of his judg-
ment.10 3 An accountant, like any other professional, is obligated to act
in good faith and with reasonable competence."° GAAS recognizes,
however, that even the reasonable accountant might not detect material
errors during an audit. °10 Such errors do not in themselves indicate inad-
96. See Downing and Miller, supra note 9, at 782 ("Unlike the statutory requirements
for compliance with section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, and the body of judi-
cial precedents which have fleshed out those requirements, there are few, if any, require-
ments or standards which provide an accountant with sufficient notice of... what the
SEC might deem 'improper professional conduct' in a given situation."). See supra pt. I.
97. See Professional Standards, supra note 13, AU § 331.03 (1983).
98. See id. AU § 336.12.
99. See supra note 16.
100. Courts have recognized that accountants, like other professionals, are held to the
degree of care, skill and competence exercised by reasonably competent members of their
profession under the circumstances. See, eg., Franklin Supply Co. v. Tolman, 454 F.2d
1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1972); In re Hawaii Corp., 567 F. Supp. 609, 617 (D. Hawaii
1983); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 253, 72 N.W.2d 364, 367 (1955). If the
Commission were to adopt expressly the standard of reasonableness in the profession,
vagueness concerns would be mitigated. Cf. A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co.,
267 U.S. 233, 241-42 (1925) ("A standard thus developed and accepted in actual practice,
when made the test of compliance with legislative commands or prohibitions, usually
meets the requirement of due process of law in point of being sufficiently definite and
intelligible.").
101. See Middleton, supra note 14, at 32.
102. See supra note 16.
103. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Hawaii
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 609, 617 (D. Hawaii 1983); SEC v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 378
F. Supp. 430, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Professional Standards, supra note 13, AU § 327.13.
104. Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 253, 72 N.W.2d 364, 367 (1955). See
supra note 100.
105. An examination made in accordance with generally accepted auditing stan-
dards is subject to the inherent limitations of the auditing process. As with
certain business controls, the costs of audits should bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the benefits expected to be derived. As a result, the concept of selective
testing of the data being examined, which involves judgment both as to the
number of transactions to be examined and as to the areas to be tested, has been
generally accepted as a valid and sufficient basis for an auditor to express an
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equate professional performance and should not be the basis of SEC dis-
ciplinary proceedings." °6 If the Commission believes that the
professional standards of reasonableness should not govern particular au-
diting decisions, the Commission should promulgate rules delineating the
precise manner in which the auditor should make such decisions. For
example, if the Commission finds GAAS insufficient in areas of evidence
gathering or selective testing, it should promulgate a rule that specifically
sets forth the amount of evidence or testing required in a given
circumstance. 107
A negligence standard adequately protects clients and the investing
opinion on financial statements. Thus, the auditor's examination, based on the
concept of selective testing of the data being examined, is subject to the inherent
risk that material errors or irregularities if they exist, will not be detected.
Professional Standards, supra note 13, AU § 327.11.
106. See id. AU § 327.13.
107. The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes federal agencies to promulgate
rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). This process permits those who are regulated to have a
voice in formulating the standards and rules to be followed. See NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 781 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); B. Schwartz, Administra-
tive Law 149, 195-96 (2d ed. 1984). The result is wide-ranging discussion of important
issues, which leads to more responsible administrative action. See Wyman-Gordon, 394
U.S. at 779 (Douglas, J., dissenting); B. Schwartz, supra, at 149. Such broad discourse
does not occur during an adversarial adjudication. See B. Schwartz, supra, at 195-96. See
generally 2 K. Davis, supra note 69, § 10.3 (limits of the adjudicatory process). Moreover,
in heavily regulated industries such as the accounting profession, rulemaking not only
provides guidance and predictability but also fosters sound policy development. See Na-
tional Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 951 (1974); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). Despite the benefits of rulemaking, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly indicated that each agency may determine whether rulemaking or
adjudication should be used in a given circumstance. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-94 (1974) (NLRB legitimately used adjudication to determine
whether certain types of buyers were managerial employees); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 (1969) (NLRB properly used adjudication to direct respondent to
furnish an employee list for the purposes of a union election); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (SEC properly used adjudication despite the lack of general rules
regarding the transaction at issue). In declining to mandate that the SEC follow rulemak-
ing procedures, the Court in Chenery noted that the Commission should use its "in-
formed discretion" when choosing between rulemaking and adjudication. Chenery, 332
U.S. at 203. The Court enunciated three instances in which administrative agencies need
flexibility: when confronted with problems that are not reasonably foreseeable, when in-
volved in areas where the agency lacks experience, and when dealing with problems that
are not susceptible to a general rule. Id. at 202-03. The third factor is implicated in Rule
2(e) cases involving auditing standards that require the exercise of professional judgment.
See supra notes 11, 12, 16, 23-32 and accompanying text. In these instances the Com-
mission should have the flexibility to utilize disciplinary adjudications because the
problems that arise may not be amenable to solution by general rule. For example, the
SEC might be unable to spell out exactly how much evidence should be gathered during
an audit. See, e.g., In re Wilson, Acct. Series Release No. 30, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,430, at 63,126-27 (1984); In re Touche Ross & Co., Acct. Series Release No. 16, 6
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,416, at 63,077 (1983); In re Simmon, Acct. Series Release
No. 12, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,412, at 63,033-35 (1983). Therefore, despite the
general benefits of rulemaking, it is unlikely that the SEC will employ this mechanism in
regulating areas that clearly demand professional judgment.
DISCIPLINAR Y PROCEEDINGS
public °8 from accountants who act in an incompetent manner. The ac-
countant, however, needs additional safeguards to ensure that he is not
unduly disciplined in the sensitive area of professional judgment. 09 Due
to the severity of available sanctions, "' one commentator has suggested
that once a Rule 2(e) violation is established, the SEC should not impose
sanctions unless it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
there is a likelihood that the respondent will repeat the actionable con-
duct."' Although this approach is viable, a more comprehensive alter-
native is to amend Rule 2(e) to provide explicitly for the types of
sanctions available when the accountant's judgment-making process is
found to have been deficient. For example, if an accountant is found to
have been negligent in making a judgment, no sanction greater than cen-
sure could be imposed. If such an infraction occurs a second time, how-
108. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 581 (2d Cir. 1979) ("fT]he Com-
mission must necessarily rely heavily on both the accounting and legal professions to
perform their tasks diligently and responsibly. Breaches of professional responsibility
jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of the securities laws and can inflict great
damage on public investors."). In addition to serving the client, an accountant provides
investors with important financial information that often forms the basis of investment
and economic decisions. See Note, Reassessing the Validity of SEC Rule 2(e) Discipline of
Accountants, 59 B.U.L. Rev. 968, 985 (1979).
109. See SEC v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 378 F. Supp. 430, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
("an accountant is not a guarantor of the reports he prepares and is only duty bound to
act honestly, in good faith and with reasonable care in the discharge of his professional
obligations"); Professional Standards, supra note 13, AU § 327.13 ("The auditor is not an
insurer or guarantor"). The SEC's disciplinary rules provide that a party may propose an
offer of settlement which will be accepted by the Commission if it serves the public inter-
est to do so. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.8 (1984). Almost all Rule 2(e) proceedings result in
these settlement letters. See, e.g., In re Feldhake, Acct. Series Release No. 27, 6 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,427, at 63,104 (1984); In re Murphy, Hauser, O'Conner &
Quinn, Acct. Series Release No. 18, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) c 73,418, at 63,089
(1983); In re Goldberg, Acct. Series Release No. 13, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 73,412,
at 63,061 (1983); In re Simmon, Acct. Series Release No. 12, 6 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) f
73,412, at 63,052 (1983). In these settlements, the respondent neither admits nor denies
the factual assertions, findings or conclusions set forth by the Commission in the SEC's
Opinion and Order. One commentator has referred to them as a "breeding ground for
injustice," partially because "the extent of the accountant's actual indiscretion is never
really reached." See SEC Disciplinary Proceedings, supra note 9, at 272. "The potential
penalty of [license] revocation. . . is so threatening to the survival of accounting firms
[,however,] that such firms are under strong pressure to try to negotiate a settlement."
Bialkin, supra note 54, at 831. The result is that the Commission need not prove its
allegations before an administrative law judge, and the respondent neither admits nor
denies them.
110. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
111. See Hellerstein, Safeguards in SEC Disciplinary Proceedings, 16 Rev. of Sec. Reg.
915, 918 (1983). Mr. Hellerstein's article came in the wake of Steadman v. SEC. 450 U.S.
91, 102 (1981), where the Supreme Court held that the standard of proof to be applied in
SEC administrative proceedings is the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Accord-
ing to Mr. Hellerstein, requiring the SEC to prove before the imposition of sanctions that
an individual is likely to repeat his violation would "lessen the risk that a respondent
who fairly believed that his conduct conformed to the applicable laws and regulations
could be sanctioned." Hellerstein, supra, at 918. Of course, Mr. Hellerstein discusses only
the remedy to be applied when a Rule 2(e) violation is found; he does not address the
critical question of what constitutes improper professional conduct.
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ever, or if the offense indicates that the accountant exercised no care in
making his judgment, the sanction could include either censure or sus-
pension. This approach is in accord with proportionality principles es-
tablished by the Supreme Court. 1 2 The result would be a balance
between the Commission's duty to protect the investing public II and the
accountant's need to make numerous decisions based on judgment." '4
CONCLUSION
The SEC has a critical role to play in preserving honesty and integrity
in the nation's financial markets. Toward this end, disciplinary rules
should be employed to prevent the incompetent, dishonest or reckless
accountant from practicing before the Commission. In recent years,
however, the Commission has employed the "improper professional con-
duct" standard of its Rule 2(e) to place its own gloss on professional
standards of reasonableness. As a result, the accountant does not know
what behavior will constitute actionable conduct.
To limit the vagueness problems of the current improper professional
conduct rule, the SEC should substitute a more specific standard. Such a
standard would be provided by an approach permitting discipline of ac-
countants who have negligently applied accounting rules but limiting the
sanctions available to the Commission when the accountant has violated
a rule that requires professional judgment. This standard strikes an ap-
propriate balance between the SEC's duty to protect the investing public
and the accountant's need to exercise his judgment without fear of jeop-
ardizing his business reputation.
Michael J. Crane
112. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3006-08 (1983) ("The principle that a pun-
ishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in
common-law jurisprudence [and] has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a
century."); cf, e.g., Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (death penalty excessive
for felony murder when defendant did not take life, or intend that a life be taken or that
lethal force be used); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910) (sentence of 15
years at hard labor disproportionate for crime of falsifying a public document). But cf.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980) (life imprisonment sentence for third
felony conviction not unconstitutionally disproportionate).
113. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); SEC v. Southwest
Coal & Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 1318 (5th Cir. 1980).
114. See supra notes 16, 101-06.
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